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Municipal Case Law Update

October – December 2011

 

 

Cleveland Contacts:

 

Stephen L. Byron                                              Margaret A. Cannon

(440) 951-2303                                                   (216) 621-5101

stephen.byron@icemiller.com                            Margaret.cannon@icemiller.com

 

Rebecca K. Schaltenbrand

(216) 621-5307

rebecca.schaltenbrand@icemiller.com

 

Columbus Contacts:

 

Steve J. Smith                                                  Philip K. Hartmann

(614) 462-2249                                                   (614) 462-4941

stephen.smith@icemiller.com                             philip.hartman@icemiller.com

 

Christopher W. Michael

(614) 462-1148

christopher.michael@icemiller.com

 



OHIO CASE LAW

 

Administrative Appeals

 

Lorenzo Properties, II, Inc. v. Akron, 2011-Ohio-5369.

 

Lorenzo Properties sought a conditional-use permit from the City of Akron that would allow a building Lorenzo owned to be split into three apartments. After reviewing the application, Akron City Council denied the request and Lorenzo filed a notice of appeal in the Summit County Common Pleas Court. The notice included instructions to the clerk to serve a copy of the notice on the City at the address of the City Law Department. The Law Department received the notice one day after expiration of the time for appeal, and Lorenzo did not otherwise file the notice of appeal with the City.

 

Lorenzo also filed a praecipe with the court requesting the City to prepare a transcript of the City’s denial of Lorenzo’s conditional-use permit. Lorenzo timely served the praecipe on the City at the City Law Department’s office. The common pleas court dismissed Lorenzo’s attempted appeal as untimely. Lorenzo subsequently appealed the court’s dismissal arguing that the court improperly dismissed its appeal because the praecipe constituted a notice of appeal, and that its service of the praecipe on the Law Department was sufficient to file it with City Council.

 

On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the court of common pleas decision to dismiss Lorenzo’s appeal. In doing so, the appellate court rejected Lorenzo’s claim that the praecipe was constituted a notice of appeal because the praecipe did not describe the particular decision that Lorenzo was appealing. The praecipe did not even indicate that Lorenzo was appealing a decision of the City Council. As such, the praecipe could not be considered a valid notice of appeal.

 

Additionally, serving the praecipe on the City’s Law Department was insufficient to perfect an appeal from an administrative body.

 

This case was analyzed under Welsh Dev. Co. v. Warren County Reg'l Planning Comm'n, 128 Ohio St.3d 471, 946 N.E.2d 215, 2011–Ohio–1604, which had held that timely service of a notice of appeal by the Clerk of Courts office was sufficient to perfect an appeal under R.C. 2505.04. This case stands for the proposition that, while service of a notice of appeal by the clerk of courts on the municipality is sufficient, appellants’ counsel will be at-risk if they depend upon the clerk’s office for timely service.

 

 

State ex rel. Lane v. Pickerington, 130 Ohio St.3d 225, 2011-Ohio-5454.

 

A former employee of the City of Pickerington had his employment terminated by the City for certain disciplinary reasons. After receiving a hand-delivered notice of the termination, the employee requested a hearing before the City Personnel Appeals Board ("PAB"). His request was subsequently denied in a letter sent from the City Law Director stating that the employee's former position was unclassified and exempt under City Code.

 

Several months after receiving the letter denying his request, the former employee filed suit in the Court of Appeals for Fairfield County seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the City and PAB to conduct a hearing on the merits of his appeal. The court denied the writ because it determined that the former employee had an adequate remedy at law available by way of administrative appeal to the common pleas court from the PAB's decision. The former employee subsequently appealed.

 

The City argued on appeal that the denial should be affirmed citing Henderson v. Maple Hts. Civ. Serv. Comm., 63 Ohio St.2d 39, 406 N.E.2d 1105 (1980) in support. However, the Ohio Supreme Court distinguished Henderson claiming that the letter sent by Pickerington's Law Director did not constitute a final appealable order. Unlike in Henderson, the Court determined that the City's letter was not issued on behalf of the PAB and questioned whether the City's Law Director had the authority to issue a decision on the PAB's behalf. Thus, the Court reversed the court of appeals decision holding that there was no final appealable order issued by the PAB from which an administrative appeal could be taken.

 

 

Elections

 

State ex rel. Miller v. Warren Cty. Bd. Of Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 24, 2011-Ohio-4623

 

The Mason City Charter prescribed certain term limits for Mason City Council (“Council”) members. This provision was later amended by a vote of the Mason electorate. Prior to this amendment, Mike Gilb was appointed to Council to complete an unexpired term that ended in December 2009. Gilb resigned from this position one month before the term ended. Subsequently, Gilb was appointed to fulfill a second unexpired term that ends in December 2011. On June 9, 2011, Relators to this action sent a letter to the Warren County Board of Elections (“Board”) claiming that Gilb, who had taken out candidate petitions for the November 8, 2011 general election for Council, was ineligible to run under the term limits provisions of the Charter.

 

The Board considered Relators’ letter and determined that there was no action to take because Gilb had not filed a petition to run for any office, and even if he did file a petition the question of whether a person may hold an office is separate from whether a person may run for the office in question. As a result, the Board opined that it could not prevent Gilb from running even if he were to file a petition for candidacy. Gilb filed his nominating petition to run for Council at the November 8 election on August 23, 2011. Relators brought this expedited election action three days later seeking a writ of prohibition and mandamus.

 

After considering the merits of the case, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that Relators were not entitled to a writ of prohibition because they could not establish that the Board was about to exercise quasi-judicial authority since Relators submitted their letter to the Board prematurely. The letter was not a valid protest under R.C. 3501.39, thus, the Board was not required to conduct a hearing regarding Gilb’s petition for candidacy. Further, Relators could not establish that they lacked an adequate remedy at law since they could have raised their claims against Gilb in a statutory protest pursuant to R.C. 3501.39. As a result, they were not entitled to the requested writ of prohibition.

 

Regarding Relators’ requested relief in mandamus, the Supreme Court concluded that the requested relief was actually in the nature of a declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction, which divested the Court of jurisdiction to consider the merits of the claim. The Court noted that although the allegations of the Complaint were couched in terms of affirmative duties, Relators actually sought a declaration that Gilb’s candidacy violated the term limits of the Charter, and a prohibitory injunction preventing Gilb from appearing on the election ballot. Consequently the writ was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

 

 

State ex rel. Julnes v. S. Euclid City Council, 130 Ohio St.3d 6, 2011-Ohio-4485.

 

On June 27, 2011, the South Euclid City Council enacted Ordinance No. 05-11, which amended the zoning for certain property from a one family residential district to a general commercial district. Three days later, a group of residents opposed to Ordinance No. 05-11 filed a certified copy of the Ordinance with the Clerk of Council, and sought to obtain the necessary signatures for a referendum on the Ordinance. The referendum petitioners then filed their petition with the Clerk to place the Ordinance on the November 8, 2011 ballot.

 

After the petition was transferred to the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections (“Board”), the Board determined that the petition contained sufficient valid signatures and returned it to the Clerk. However, upon the advice of the City’s Law Director, the Clerk determined that the petitioners had failed to file a certified copy of the Ordinance with the City Finance Director and reported this to Council. Council then decided not to submit the Ordinance to the electorate. Four days after this decision, Relators filed this expedited election action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Clerk to determine the petition was valid and to compel the City Council to either repeal the Ordinance or place it on the November 8, 2011 ballot.

 

After considering the parties’ evidence and briefs, the Ohio Supreme Court granted the requested writ of mandamus finding that the petitioners had complied with the requirements of R.C. 731.32 by filing a certified copy of the Ordinance with the City Clerk prior to circulating the referendum petition. The Court noted that while R.C. 731.32 requires a certified copy of an Ordinance to be filed with the city auditor before circulating a referendum petition, South Euclid has no city auditor. Thus, the Court concluded that the City Clerk’s duties under the City Charter regarding referendum petitions are more closely aligned with the duties of a city auditor under R.C. 731.29 than the Director of Finance’s duties are. For that reason, filing a certified copy of the Ordinance with the Clerk was sufficient to comply with R.C. 731.32.

 

Additionally, the Court held that the Ordinance was subject to referendum even though it was enacted as an emergency ordinance. Since the City Charter expressly subjected emergency ordinances to referendum, the provisions of R.C. 731.29 and 731.30 did not apply in this situation to remove the Ordinance from the possibility of referendum. Accordingly, the Relators had a clear legal right to have the Ordinance either repealed or submitted to the electorate, and the Clerk and Council had a corresponding legal duty to do the same.

 

 


Home Rule

 

Greene v. Cuyahoga Cty., 2011-Ohio-5493.

 

In November 2009, the voters of Cuyahoga County adopted the Cuyahoga County Charter (“Charter”), which replaced the county’s statutory form of government with a new governing structure led by an elected county executive and 11-member council. Under the Charter, the council would be vested with the authority previously held by the county commissioners, and the county executive would be charged with the duty of appointing individuals to hold county positions previously held by elected office-holders, including the County Recorder. Additionally, the former county offices would be abolished when the appointed individual took office on or after January 1, 2011.

 

After the Charter was adopted the County Recorder (“Recorder”), whose position would be prematurely terminated when the new government took effect, filed this action along with several other electors claiming that the Charter provisions abolishing elected offices mid-term was retroactive law and unconstitutional. The Recorder claimed that officeholders have a right under the Ohio Constitution to fill the remainder of an elected term of office, and that electors have a vested constitutional right to expect that an elected public official will fulfill the entire term to which her or she was elected. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas granted the County’s motion. Only one of the original plaintiffs appealed.

 

On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision holding that Ohio law permits statutory offices to be abolished mid-term, and that public officers have no vested property interest right in the office they hold. The court noted that statutory county offices are created by the General Assembly, not the Constitution of Ohio. Thus, the voters of Cuyahoga County were empowered by Article X, Section 3, of the Ohio Constitution to adopt home rule and abolish the statutory offices, even in mid-term. Further, the court restated the long-standing principle that a county office is a public privilege and not a right. Therefore, the Charter was not unconstitutional, but rather a valid exercise of the County’s home rule authority.

 

 

Public Records

 

State ex rel. Dawson v. Bloom-Carroll Local School Dist., 2011-Ohio-6009.

 

In March 2010, Angela Dawson sent an email to the treasurer of the Bloom-Carroll Local School District (“District”) requesting copies of any and all invoices the District had received from any law firm that had provided services relating to any matters pertaining to herself and/or either of her children. The District responded by providing Dawson with summaries of the invoices noting the attorney’s name, the invoice total, and the matter involved. The District did not provide Dawson with itemized invoices because they contained confidential information relating to attorney-client communications, the areas and issues the attorneys researched, and the legal issues upon which the attorneys focused their attention.

 

Dawson subsequently informed the District that she still desired the itemized invoices, and hand-delivered a written request for said invoices on December 20, 2010. The District again denied the request on the basis that the invoices contained confidential information.

 

Dawson further sought to obtain any and all communications from the District’s insurance carrier that described the liability and exposure of the District and insurance carrier related to a lawsuit filed against the District by Douglas Dawson. The District denied this request as well stating that only one document dated February 9, 2010 was responsive to the request, and it too was confidential in nature because it was prepared by the District insurer’s claims analyst and appointed the District’s attorney to defend Dawson’s lawsuit.

 

As a result of the District’s denial, Dawson subsequently instituted this original action in mandamus seeking to compel the production of the itemized invoices along with the February 9, 2010 letter. After the District filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Supreme Court granted an alternative writ and ordered the District to submit unredacted copies of the records for in camera review. Dawson claimed that the District waived any privilege related to the February 9, 2010 letter because it openly discussed the letter at a public meeting and voluntarily disclosed it to a former school board member.

 

After reviewing the records, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the writ of mandamus sought by Dawson. The Court opined that while a simple invoice ordinarily is not privileged, itemized legal bills necessarily reveal confidential information that falls within the attorney-client privilege. Further, to the extent that narrative portions of attorney-fee statements are descriptions of legal services performed by counsel for a client, they are protected because they represent communications between the attorney and client about matters for which the attorney has been retained by the client. The Court went on to reason that the February 9, 2010 letter was also privileged under the attorney-client privilege because the insurance carrier, in effect, stands in the shoes of the District. As such, the letter was privileged from disclosure, and the District did not waive the confidentiality of the document because it discussed the merits of the document only during executive session. Therefore, mandamus was denied.

 

 

State ex rel. Davila v. Bucyrus, 194 Ohio App.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-1731.

 

In 2009, Davila sent a letter addressed to the City of Bucyrus (“Bucyrus”) requesting copies of the minutes and public notices of all meetings held by the City’s Records Commission. Davila also sent a letter that same day to the Bucyrus Police Chief requesting access to the department’s reel-to-reel tapes and other information relating to the tapes. The City produced the minutes and public notices for the previous five years, requested a clarification of Davila’s request, and instructed Davila to contact other City Officials to arrange a time that he could access additional information. Unsatisfied after subsequent correspondence, Davila filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel public disclosure and civil forfeiture.

 

Davila served Bucyrus with a request for admission that provided for 28 days to respond. Bucyrus failed to respond within the stated time and Davila moved that his unanswered requests be taken as admitted and for summary judgment. Over objection, the trial court granted Davila’s motions and awarded Davila a judgment in the amount of $1,409,000 for the improper destruction of 1,409 records based solely on the unanswered requests for admission. The trial court subsequently overruled Bucyrus’ moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, remittitur, and new trial, and Bucyrus appealed.

 

The Third District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order finding that the trial court should have granted Bucyrus’ motion to withdraw or amend its default admissions because it would aid in hearing the merits of the case and because Davila did not demonstrate prejudice. By not allowing Bucyrus to withdraw its default admissions, the trial court eliminated any presentation of the merits. Additionally, the Third District noted that Bucyrus had timely filed an answer to Davila’s complaint that denied liability; thus, Davila could not have reasonably relied on the default admissions. As a result, summary judgment was improper because the trial court based its decision only on the default admissions that should have been set aside and no other supporting evidence.

 

 

Tort Immunity

 

Inland Prods., Inc. v. Columbus, 193 Ohio App.3d 740, 2011-Ohio-2046.

 

During the unusually wet and rainy winter of 2004-2005, the City of Columbus experienced severe saturation and flooding, which placed heavy stress on the City’s sewer and drainage systems. As a result, the sewer and drainage systems became overwhelmed and could not be relieved due to the unusually high elevation of the Scioto River. City employees unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the systems from backing up. The overwhelmed systems began discharging through manholes located on City property and property owned by Inland Products, Inc. (“Inland”).

 

Inland then instituted this action to recover damages for the alleged negligent maintenance and operation of the City’s sewer system that resulted in the flooding of Inland’s property. The City moved for summary judgment claiming political subdivision immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744. Specifically, the City argued that Inland was attacking the design of the sewer system, a government function that is immune from liability under R.C. 2744, and that it was immune under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) because Inland’s alleged injury resulted from exercise of judgment or discretion. The trial court denied the City’s motion and the City appealed under R.C. 2744.02(C).

 

Addressing numerous assignments of error, the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court’s decision. The Tenth District affirmed the trial court’s ruling that R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) did apply to remove immunity from the City because the operation of the sewer systems was a proprietary function. The court also determined that the trial court did not err in finding that genuine issues of fact existed as to whether City employees acted negligently in closing certain gates, and whether the employees’ actions caused the flooding on Inland’s property. However, the court reversed that part of the trial court’s ruling denying summary judgment under R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) because the City employees’ decision to conduct hydraulic gradeline modeling prior to adopting a sewer operation system involved the exercise of judgment or discretion sufficient to reinstate immunity under the statute. The case was remanded to determine whether the City negligently operated the sewer systems.

 

 

Hawsman v. Cuyahoga Falls, 2011-Ohio-3795.

Hawsman, a minor, injured his knee while using a diving board at the City of Cuyahoga Falls’ Natatorium, a venue which the City owns and maintains. Hawsman’s parents filed suit as a result of their son’s injuries alleging that the City negligently maintained the diving board. The City moved for summary judgment claiming that it was immune from suit pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744 and the Supreme Court’s holding in Cater v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d. 24 (1998). The trial court agreed and granted the City’s motion. The Hawsmans timely appealed the decision.

 

On appeal, the Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the City was not immune because R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) applied to the City Natatorium and the operation and maintenance of the swimming pool was a governmental function that removed the City’s general grant of immunity. In doing so, the Ninth District found the Supreme Court’s decision in Cater lacking in precedential value, and discussed other courts of appeals decisions that called Cater into question. Specifically, the Ninth District agreed with the Third and Fourth District Courts of Appeals decisions determining that public recreational facilities fall under the exception to immunity found in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). The Sixth and Eighth Districts conflict with this interpretation as each has followed Cater upholding political subdivision immunity for torts occurring at public recreational facilities. The Eighth District has also held that the more specific provisions of R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(u) prevail over the more general provisions of R.C. 2744.02(B)(4).

 

The City has appealed the Ninth District’s reversal, and the Supreme Court of Ohio accepted jurisdiction to hear the case on December 21, 2011. This is likely due to the erratic and inconsistent interpretations the courts of appeals have given to public recreational facilities in connection with R.C. Chapter 2744, which the foregoing demonstrates.

 

 

Johnson v. Cleveland, 194 Ohio App.3d 355, 2011-Ohio-2152.

 

The City of Cleveland’s Emergency Medical Service (“EMS”) responded to a call initiated by Plaintiff Johnson’s girlfriend after Johnson had smoked a cigarette laced with phencyclidine (“PCP”). After EMS arrived, Johnson refused medical treatment or evaluation and appeared to be suffering no visible impairment. EMS technicians remained at Johnson’s residence for approximately 20 minutes before being released by the lead technician. After leaving the residence, EMS placed a call to Johnson’s residence approximately 10 minutes later, and Johnson appeared to be fine.

Shortly after the call was made to Johnson’s residence, EMS was called back to the same scene for a “psychiatric/suicide” attempt after Johnson had jumped off of the second story of the residence. Johnson seriously injured himself as a result of the leap. EMS arrived quickly, immobilized Johnson, and assessed Johnson while transporting him to a nearby hospital. Johnson was treated for multiple fractures and became permanently paralyzed from the waist down. He subsequently filed this action against the City of Cleveland and the EMS personnel who responded to the calls.

 

The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment based on R.C. Chapter 2744 finding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the facts alleged by Johnson constituted willful or wanton conduct. Cleveland timely appealed the trial court’s denial pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(C).

 

On appeal, the Eighth District reversed the trial court’s decision holding that reasonable minds could not find that the actions of the EMS personnel rose to the level of willful or wanton conduct. Noting that willful or wanton conduct requires a showing of more than mere negligence, the Eight District stated that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the EMS personnel engaged in any misconduct with the intent to injure Johnson. Specifically, the paramedics timely responded to the scene, visually assessed Johnson, continued to wait on the scene, and informed Johnson’s girlfriend to call if anything changed. Neither was there any evidence that the EMS personnel should have been aware that there was any great probability that harm would result or that they perversely disregarded a known risk. Thus, Cleveland was entitled to summary judgment under R.C. Chapter 2744.

 

 

Long v. Hanging Rock, 2011-Ohio-5137.

 

The Chief of Police (“Chief”) of the Village of Hanging Rock had his position terminated because he was unable to run and perform a fitness and agility test due to injury he sustained in the course of his employment. He subsequently filed a complaint against the Village and other Village Officials alleging, amongst other things, that the Village wrongfully discharged him from his employment in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim. Both sides moved for summary judgment with the Village arguing that it was immune from suit under R.C. Chapter 2744. The trial court denied the motions with respect to immunity and wrongful discharge.

 

Chief appealed the partial denial of summary judgment to the Fourth District Court of Appeals. After the parties had the chance to brief the issue of political subdivision immunity, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the Village immunity with respect to the wrongful discharge claim. Specifically, the fourth District determined that the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act does not apply to the Chief’s claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

 

Also, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the Village’s acting Police Chief acted with a malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner when he posted a mocking picture of Chief at the police station. According to the court, reasonable minds could conclude that this conduct demonstrates malice, bad faith, or wanton or reckless conduct. Notably, the Fourth District refused to hear any issues on appeal regarding the merits of the case, despite the fact that some issues were intertwined with the issue of immunity, claiming that R.C. 2744.02(C) did not confer jurisdiction to hear any issues other than the denial of immunity.

 

 

Zoning

 

Three Wide Entertainment v. Athens Bd. Of Zoning Appeals, 194 Ohio App. 3d 1, 2011-Ohio-2304.

 

Three Wide submitted a zoning-permit application to the Athens Board of Zoning Appeals (“Board”) for property owned by Three Wide along Stimson Avenue in Athens. Three Wide sought the permit to operate an adult oriented business on the property. After a hearing was held describing Three Wide’s business in detail, the Board voted 5-0 to deny the application because the proposed use was not a principally permitted use. Three Wide then submitted three additional permit applications with each proposing a different use. These applications were each refused by the zoning administrator based on the prior denial, and subsequently denied by the Board after a second hearing.

 

After the second denial, Three Wide filed a R.C. 2506 appeal with the Athens County Court of Common Pleas. The court determined that the Board had applied the wrong legal standard in denying Three Wide’s permit applications, and vacated the Board’s decision but stated that its judgment was not a judgment of reversal. The Board subsequently appealed the court’s decision.

 

On review, the Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed the common pleas court’s decision finding that the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the Board used the incorrect legal standard in denying Three Wide’s applications. The Fourth District noted that, under the Athens City Code, the Board’s limited duty was to review Three Wide’s applications and determine whether the proposed business fit within the definition of a principal permitted use of a B-3 Zone or whether the business qualified as the same general character as such a principal permitted use. The record indicated that the Board members were unclear as to what their role was in reviewing the applications, and that Board members relied on extraneous considerations in denying the applications. The Board members essentially substituted their own considerations and factored in the potential effects that an adult oriented business would have on Stimson Avenue instead of solely determining whether the business was a principal permitted use. Therefore, the common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the Board’s decision.

 

This publication is intended for general information purposes only and does not and is not intended to constitute legal advice. The reader must consult with legal counsel to determine how laws or decisions discussed herein apply to the reader's specific circumstances.