On March 25, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a landmark decision in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment that significantly narrows the circumstances under which online service providers can be held secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by their users. Reversing a $1 billion verdict, the Supreme Court held that an internet service provider (ISP) cannot be found contributorily liable simply because it knows that its service is being used for infringement and continues to provide access. Instead, liability requires proof that the provider intended its service to be used for infringement.

This ruling materially reshapes the enforcement environment for copyright owners, brand owners, and other businesses that rely on takedown notices, repeat infringer policies, or pressure on intermediaries to curb online infringement.

The Supreme Court’s Holding

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) does not expressly impose liability for infringement committed by another party, such as an ISP. However, under the Supreme Court’s precedent, there are two categories of liability for the copyright infringement of another: contributory liability, which is the focus of the Supreme Court’s ruling, and vicarious liability. Secondary copyright liability exists only in limited, historically recognized forms. For contributory infringement, the Supreme Court made clear that intent is essential. An ISP, for example, intends infringement only if one of two conditions is met:

1. Inducement – the ISP actively encourages or expressly promotes infringement through marketing, instructions, or affirmative conduct; or
2. Tailored Service – the ISP supplies a product or service that is not capable of substantial or commercially significant non infringing uses.

It is the copyright owner’s responsibility to show the requisite intent. Mere knowledge that infringement is occurring or that a service will be used to infringe, even widespread, repeated infringement, does not satisfy the intent requirement. Failure to take aggressive steps to prevent infringement also does not satisfy the intent requirement. The Supreme Court emphasized that it has repeatedly rejected attempts to impose contributory liability based solely on knowledge plus inaction.

Application to Cox’s Conduct

Applying the contributory infringement framework, the Supreme Court held that Cox Communications, Inc. (Cox) was not contributorily liable for the infringement of copyrights belonging to Sony Music Entertainment (Sony). Cox provided general internet access—a service capable of extensive lawful use—and did not promote, encourage, or design its service to facilitate infringement.

Although Cox received more than 163,000 infringement notices over a two year period and continued providing internet service to many implicated accounts, the Supreme Court found that Cox neither induced infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement. Importantly, the Supreme Court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s ruling that supplying a product with knowledge that it will be used to infringe copyrights is enough to establish contributory liability.

Consequences for the DMCA Enforcement Framework and Impact on Businesses Seeking to Take Down Infringers

The Supreme Court’s decision carries major implications for copyright enforcement under the DMCA, particularly the repeat infringer policy requirement relied on by many copyright holders to enforce their copyrights in a landscape where repeat infringers frequently pop up again after infringing content is taken down. The Supreme Court stressed that the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions do not create liability; instead, it merely provides new defenses when liability exists. Failure to qualify for a safe harbor does not “bear adversely” on a provider’s ability to argue that its conduct is not infringing in the first place (See 17 U. S. C. §512(l)). As a practical matter, the Supreme Court’s ruling means that an ISP that neither induces infringement nor offers an infringement focused product may face no secondary liability risk at all, regardless of how aggressively or passively it enforces a repeat infringer policy.

The ruling significantly limits the leverage that copyright owners and brand owners have traditionally used against intermediaries:

• Notice campaigns alone are insufficient: Large volumes of infringement notices do not establish contributory liability without evidence of inducement or deliberate infringement oriented design. For example, in Cox, the insufficient notice type only pointed to which Internet Protocol address was used, and not to the specific infringer who used it to infringe on a copyright-protected creation. 
• “Knowledge plus inaction” theories are foreclosed: Copyright and brand owners can no longer rely on mere proof that a provider knew infringement was occurring and failed to stop it because they must now show that the defendant actually intended to aid infringement.
• Pressure on backbone providers is reduced: ISPs, broadband providers, and other infrastructure players are far more insulated from infringement claims tied to user behavior.

As a result, attempts to use litigation or the threat of liability to force access termination or account shutdowns by neutral intermediaries will be substantially more difficult.

Strategic Implications Going Forward

Following Cox, effective enforcement strategies must adopt:

• Greater focus on inducement evidence: Cases will turn on marketing materials, product design choices, user guidance, and internal communications that show affirmative encouragement of infringement.
• Renewed emphasis on direct infringers: Although costly and challenging at scale, actions against end users regain relative importance. It is important that copyright and brand owners now take the extra step of finding out who the exact individual infringer is.
• Contractual and technological tools: Businesses may need to rely more on licensing structures, access controls, content identification technologies, and private agreements rather than secondary liability litigation.

For ISPs, the decision offers meaningful protection but does not fully eliminate the risk of liability. Inducement liability remains intact, and services designed or promoted as infringement friendly remain vulnerable.

Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence emphasizes that the Supreme Court’s decision does not foreclose all secondary liability theories for copyright and brand owners. While neutral service providers like Cox escaped liability on these facts, the concurrence discusses the viability of common law aiding and abetting theories where plaintiffs can prove affirmative assistance, specific intent, and meaningful participation in infringement. For copyright and brand owners, the message is clear: future enforcement must move beyond notice and inaction theories. Successful cases and takedowns will hinge on granular evidence showing user specific knowledge, culpable conduct, or systemic practices that actively help infringement succeed. The concurrence thus offers a limited but important roadmap for targeted, fact intensive enforcement strategies going forward.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Cox v. Sony represents a decisive narrowing of secondary copyright liability. For businesses seeking to thwart infringers, the ruling makes clear that an ISP’s knowledge of infringement and failure to act are no longer enough. Only proof of intentional encouragement or deliberate infringement focused design will support claims against intermediaries, fundamentally changing the strategic approach for online copyright enforcement.

This publication is intended for general information purposes only and does not and is not intended to constitute legal advice. The reader should consult with legal counsel to determine how laws or decisions discussed herein apply to the reader’s specific circumstances.