In 2023, with Groff v. DeJoy, the U.S. Supreme Court “clarified” the well-established decision of TWA v. Hardison (1977), which held (we thought) that religious discrimination claims could be avoided by employers if the employer could show that a requested religious accommodation imposed anything more than a de minimis (minor) burden on the employer’s business operations. The clarification brought us the following (new) understanding of the employer’s religious accommodation obligations: “We hold that ‘undue hardship’ is shown when a burden is substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.” In this particular case of Groff v. DeJoy, according to the Court, insufficient evidence existed for the claim that forcing other employees to work more overtime (so that Mr. Groff could avoid working on his Sabbath) constituted a substantial harm to the employer.

Now what (when it comes to employer compliance)? Indiana may end up playing a very significant role in that answer.

In late January of 2025, the Seventh Circuit heard oral arguments, for the second time, in the case of Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation; the second time because just after deciding it the first time, the Groff decision came down and the Seventh Circuit agreed to vacate its first opinion and reconsider the whole situation in light of Groff.

The facts of the case present as follows. The plaintiff, Mr. Kluge, worked as a school music and orchestra teacher. His students included transgender children. Mr. Kluge advised the school that to address a student by a name inconsistent with their biological status violated his religious views. He requested the accommodation of calling the children by their last name. The school refused. When Mr. Kluge refused to comply with the directive to address the children by their preferred first name his employment came to an end. He proceeded to file the instant lawsuit.

The school argued that to comply with the accommodation request was an undue hardship on the school because it perceived that calling the students by their last name would cause them psychological harm and would be inconsistent with their anti-harassment policies. Counsel for Mr. Kluge countered that the U.S. Supreme Court in Groff explicitly stated that the mere displeasure of coworkers concerning an accommodation (or even imposing additional overtime obligations) did not constitute an undue hardship, and such arguments were “off the table.” The same approach should be applied here with students, argued the Groff team. They also pointed out the potential psychological harm Mr. Kluge suffered by having to endorse transgender ideology contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs.

The Seventh Circuit decision, when it comes, may provide important guidance on the contours of this (new, clarified) religious accommodation standard. Indeed, other cases in process on this issue involve vaccine mandates, attendance, attire, social media posts, and other events related to workplace conditions of employment.

What lessons exist for employers today? Unfortunately, employers must now look at any religious accommodation request with serious attention and an actual assessment of whether compliance causes harm to the employer's business of a “significant” nature. What actual economic harm arises from compliance with the accommodation? An assessment must be made.

Heed this warning or prepare to be the next target for litigation!

If you have questions, please contact David J. Carr or another member of the Workplace Solutions Group.

This publication is intended for general information purposes only and does not and is not intended to constitute legal advice. The reader should consult with legal counsel to determine how laws or decisions discussed herein apply to the reader’s specific circumstances.